



**STATE OF CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION**

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Joint Application of Comcast Corporation,)
Time Warner Cable Inc., Time Warner)
Cable Information Services (California),)
LLC, and Bright House Networks)
Information Services (California), LLC) A.14-04-013
for Expedited Approval of the Transfer of)
Control of Time Warner Cable)
Information Services (California), LLC)
(U6874C); and the Pro Forma Transfer of)
Control of Bright House Networks)
Information Services (California), LLC)
(U6955C), to Comcast)
Corporation Pursuant to California Public)
Utilities Code Section 854(a))

Joint Application of Comcast Corporation,)
Time Warner Cable Information Services)
(California), LLC (U6874C) and Charter) A.14-06-012
Fiberlink CA-CCO, LLC (U6878C) for)
Expedited Approval to Transfer Certain)
Assets and Customers of Charter Fiberlink)
CA-CCO, LLC to Time Warner Cable)
Information Services (California), LLC,)
Pursuant to Public Utilities Code)
Section 851)

**REPLY TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS OF
SUSAN M. BALDWIN
ON BEHALF OF THE UTILITY REFORM NETWORK**

December 10, 2014

ALLEGED CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION HAS BEEN REDACTED

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I. INTRODUCTION

Qualifications

Q: Are you the same Susan M. Baldwin who filed opening testimony in this proceeding?

A: Yes.

Assignment

Q: On whose behalf is this testimony being submitted?

A: This testimony is being submitted on behalf of TURN. TURN asked me to respond to the declarations submitted on December 3, 2014, on behalf of Comcast Corporation (“Comcast”) and Time Warner Cable Inc. (“Time Warner Cable” or “TWC”). This reply testimony supplements my initial testimony. I respond to the declarations of Christopher McDonald, Vice President of Government Affairs for Comcast Cable’s West Division (“McDonald (Comcast)” or “Exhibit A”); Shane Portfolio, Vice President, Engineering, Comcast Cable (California Region) (“Portfolio (Comcast)” or “Exhibit B”); Kevin J. Leddy, Executive Vice President, Corporate Strategy at Time Warner Cable (“Leddy (Time Warner Cable)” or “Exhibit C”); and Mark A. Israel, Executive Vice President at Compass Lexecon, Bryan G. M. Keating, Senior Vice President at Compass Lexecon, and David A. Weiskopf, Executive Vice President at Compass Lexecon (“Israel/Keating/Weiskopf (Comcast)” or “Exhibit D”).¹

¹ The Joint Applicants’ December 3rd filing also includes Exhibits E through T. Exhibit E is entitled “Implications of the Comcast/Time Warner Cable Transaction for Broadband Competition from FCC MB Docket No. 14-57 (excerpts),” Mark A. Israel, April 8, 2014. Exhibit F is entitled “Economic Analysis of the Effect of the Comcast-TWC Transaction on Broadband: Reply to Commenters from FCC MB Docket No. 14-57 (excerpts),” Mark A. Israel, September 22, 2014. Exhibits G through L consist of selected responses by the Joint Applicants to intervenors’ interrogatories in this proceeding. Exhibit M includes

Organization of Reply Testimony

Q: How is your reply testimony organized?

A: Section I introduces my testimony. Section II discusses merger-related harms and Section III discusses merger-related benefits. In Section IV, I summarize my recommendations and conclude my reply testimony. I cross-reference my opening testimony throughout this reply testimony rather than repeat analyses and discussions that I set forth in more detail in my opening testimony.

Summary of Reply Testimony

Q: Please summarize your findings and recommendations.

selected management biographies; Exhibit N includes letters of support for the proposed transaction submitted in FCC MB Docket No. 14-57 (among other letters of support, Exhibit N includes a letter dated September 18, 2014, from John B. Horrigan, PhD, with an attached paper he authored, entitled “Analysis of Uptake Rates of Comcast Internet Essentials” (“Horrigan IE Uptake Paper”), which is also included as Attachment A to the McDonald Declaration. Exhibit O consists of excerpts from the Joint Applicants’ Public Interest Statements from FCC MB Docket No. 14-57, dated April 8, 2014 and June 4, 2014. Exhibit P includes excerpts from the Joint Applicants’ Opposition to Petitions to Deny and Response to Comments from FCC MB Docket No. 14-57, September 23, 2014. Exhibit Q includes excerpts from “An Economic Analysis of the Proposed Comcast - Time Warner Cable Transaction from FCC MB Docket No. 14-57, by Gregory L. Rosston and Michael D. Topper, April 8, 2014. Exhibit R consists of excerpts from “An Economic Analysis of the Proposed Comcast Transactions with TWC and Charter In Response to Comments and Petitions from FCC MB Docket No. 14-57,” by Gregory L. Rosston and Michael D. Topper, September 20, 2014. Exhibit S consists of excerpts from Declaration of Michael J. Angelakis, CFO Comcast Corporation from FCC MB Docket No. 14-57, April 7, 2014. Exhibit T includes excerpts from the Responses of Comcast Corporation to the Commission’s Information and Data Request (excerpt), September 11, 2014.

1 A: My review of the declarations filed on behalf of the Joint Applicants does not alter my
2 analysis and recommendations, which I summarize on pages 103 through 107 of my
3 opening testimony.

4
5 I continue to oppose the proposed transaction because it is not in the public interest.
6 Comcast's December 3rd filing fails to demonstrate that consumers would be protected
7 from potential merger-related harms, and the purported benefits that the December 3rd
8 filing discusses are vague, unenforceable, and not likely to flow through to residential
9 consumers.

10
11 Regarding merger-related harms, in its pursuit of operational synergies (which Comcast
12 has not committed to share in any fashion with consumers), Comcast likely will eliminate
13 positions, thereby shrinking employment. Also as it seeks to achieve \$1.5 billion in
14 national operational expenses annually and as it seeks to compete more effectively in the
15 mid-sized and large business markets, Comcast will confront strong economic incentives
16 to neglect customer service and service quality for its existing and newly acquired
17 residential consumers. The integration of two large companies will require significant
18 effort, which may further distract Comcast from improving its service quality. Also, the
19 transaction would harm the public interest because it would eliminate a potential
20 competitor, eliminate a valuable benchmark for consumers and regulators, and increase
21 Comcast's incentives to discriminate as it carries out its gatekeeper role.

1 Regarding purported merger-related benefits, Comcast has made soft promises to
2 improve service quality, increase broadband Internet speeds, extend Internet Essentials
3 (“IE”) to the Time Warner Cable footprint, compete more effectively in the mid-sized
4 and large business markets, offer purportedly affordable stand-alone broadband Internet
5 access, and abide by Open Internet principles, among other things. However, Comcast
6 has failed to make any measurable, enforceable commitments to follow through on any of
7 these vague promises. Comcast also contends that the merger will spur new investment
8 by the incumbent local exchange carriers (“ILEC”), but the ILECs’ track record suggests
9 that the merger will not alter the way in which ILECs decide when and where to deploy
10 fiber and to maintain their existing networks. Comcast computes a purported consumer
11 benefit associated with its plans to upgrade broadband Internet access speeds in the Time
12 Warner Cable footprint, but, at best, the analysis is flawed and irrelevant to an assessment
13 of the public interest of the proposed transaction, and at worst, contradicts the Joint
14 Applicants’ attempt to persuade the Commission that the broadband Internet access
15 market is effectively competitive.

16
17 I continue to disagree with the Joint Applicants’ assessment of the status of competition.
18 Cable companies and ILECs dominate the residential Internet access market, and indeed
19 even collaborate through cross-marketing agreements to serve the residential Internet
20 access markets. In those communities where ILECS have chosen not to roll out fiber,
21 and where consumers seek high speeds, Comcast is the sole provider of wireline
22 broadband Internet access at the higher speeds some customers are seeking.

1 I recommend that the Commission reject the proposed transaction because the probable
2 harms far outweigh the possible benefits. If, contrary to my recommendation, the
3 Commission is contemplating approving Comcast's acquisition of Time Warner Cable, I
4 recommend that the Commission seek commitments from Comcast to mitigate the harm
5 and to translate vague promises into tangible benefits.

II. MERGER-RELATED HARMS

The merger poses significant harms for consumers, employees, and communities in California.

Q: The Joint Applicants, in their December 3rd filing to the Commission, contend that the proposed merger would not harm consumers. Do you agree?

A: No. Contrary to their assertion, the proposed transaction poses significant harms to California's consumers, employees, communities, and economy. Moreover the harms are merger-specific –the merger creates new harms that do not now exist and also heightens existing harms. As I demonstrate in this section of my reply testimony, the harms concern threats to competition, service quality, employment, and an open broadband Internet network.

If the merger occurs, we will never know whether the two companies would have entered each other's footprint; moreover, if these two large companies lack the wherewithal to do so, this suggests that entry barriers are high and the prospect for competition in the broadband Internet access market is negligible.

Q: The two companies do not now compete within the same geographic areas.² Are you aware of any evidence to suggest that, if the merger were not to occur, either one would enter the other's footprint?

² See, e.g., Leddy (Time Warner Cable), at para. 6; Israel/Keating/Weiskopf (Comcast), at paras. 6, 9. See also Israel/Keating/Weiskopf, at paras. 31-32, for example, their statement in para. 32: "Put simply, the transaction will not change the number of broadband choices available to consumers. Identical logic applies to voice services."

1 A: No. One of the declarants states, “[t]o my knowledge, Comcast has never had any plans
2 to deploy facilities (or infrastructure) in TWC service areas.”³ Other Comcast declarants
3 states: “Whether Comcast and TWC could compete with each other (which presumably
4 means whether it is technologically possible) is not germane to evaluating the proposed
5 transaction,” and they further state, “[r]ather, the relevant questions are whether Comcast
6 and TWC would be likely to compete with one another—which one properly evaluates
7 by considering whether they have an incentive to expand their footprints in competition
8 with one another absent the transaction—and what competition would look like in such a
9 scenario.”⁴

10 **Q: Then, have the Joint Applicants persuaded you that the loss of potential competition**
11 **is not a concern?**

12 A: No. Despite the Joint Applicants’ contention to the contrary, the irrevocable loss of
13 potential competition that the proposed transaction necessarily would effect is a concern.

14 It is impossible to know whether the companies, which possess vast and unique resources

³ McDonald (Comcast), at para. 13. See also Leddy (Time Warner Cable), at para. 9.

⁴ Israel/Keating/Weiskopf (Comcast), at para. 44. See also *id.*, at para. 46, which describes the high fixed costs of entering new markets as well as the expense of obtaining permits, rights-of-way, etc., which they state “can be very substantial.” Of course these barriers to entry are precisely the aspects of the broadband Internet access market that render it non-competitive. If the Joint Applicants cannot profitably compete with each other, who can? The Joint Applicants’ arguments (see *id.*, at paras. 47-48) regarding *other* potential entrants (such as Google, RCN, WOW!, and telecommunications companies) are not persuasive because they rely on speculation and do not address the substantial barriers to enter that the Joint Applicants, themselves, identify. The Joint Applicants attempt to dismiss the potential competition argument with this statement: “In sum, the most likely conclusion is that Comcast and TWC are not potential competitors for one another, but if circumstances change to make such potential competition more likely, then the set of potential competitors would be so large as to nullify any concern.” *Id.*, at para. 48. The universe of potential competitors does not seem particularly “large.” I discuss ILECs’ investment patterns in Section III below.

1 and relevant expertise, one day, would enter each other's territory. As I explain in my
2 opening testimony (pages 4 and 34) this prospective competition is lost. Also, although
3 the Joint Applicants discuss maverick competitors,⁵ they do not address the fact that the
4 merger would result in the loss of a valuable benchmark for consumers and regulators.⁶
5 Also, they do not address the fact that the merger of these two large companies would
6 further tip the scale for Comcast in its lobbying position relative to local, state, and
7 federal policymakers and its relationships with its consumers.⁷

8 **Q: Have you read the Israel/Keating/Weiskopf Declaration submitted in this**
9 **proceeding?**

10 A: Yes. They "assess the extent to which the proposed transaction will generate consumer
11 benefits in California, focusing particularly on the voice and broadband segments" and
12 they also "evaluate the effects of the proposed transaction on competition in the provision
13 of voice and broadband services to residential and business customers in California."
14 They also "assess whether, on balance, the effect of the transaction in the voice and
15 broadband segments in California is expected to be pro-competitive, pro-consumer, and
16 in the public interest."⁸ I address their arguments regarding consumer benefits in Section
17 III, below.

18 **The residential broadband market is highly concentrated.**

⁵ See, e.g., id., at paras. 49-50.

⁶ See, Baldwin Opening (TURN), at 32-33.

⁷ See, id., at 4, 35.

⁸ Israel/Keating/Weiskopf (Comcast), at para. 3.

1 **Q: Comcast asserts that “customers have a large and growing set of competitive**
2 **broadband alternatives, including those offered by telco competitors, which offer**
3 **DSL, wireless, and fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP) broadband options (which AT&T,**
4 **CenturyLink, and others are committed to expanding, in part as a competitive**
5 **response to this transaction); Google Fiber; municipal overbuilds; and fixed wireless**
6 **providers.”⁹ Do you agree with this assessment of the broadband Internet access**
7 **market?**

8 **A:** No. The assessment is implausibly rosy for several reasons. First, as I discuss in my
9 opening testimony (at page 61), industry (including cable companies) have successfully
10 lobbied state legislatures to prohibit municipal broadband deployment. Although such a
11 prohibition does not now exist in California, post-transaction,¹⁰ Comcast would have yet
12 larger resources for advocating for its legislative positions and, because of its expanded
13 footprint, larger incentives to do so. Comcast has not committed to withholding its
14 support for any proposed legislation that would prohibit municipal broadband
15 deployment, or better yet, committed to opposing such legislation. Therefore, its reliance
16 on municipal broadband overbuilds is meaningless. Moreover, even if Comcast did not
17 support such legislation, other industry members could. Municipal broadband is a
18 tenuous source of alternatives for consumers, and, moreover, tends to occur precisely

⁹ Id., at para. 59, cite omitted.

¹⁰ See discussion in Baldwin Opening (TURN), at 34-35 and 61.

1 where there is no other broadband Internet access source, undermining the notion that
2 municipal broadband *competes* with other suppliers.

3
4 Second, ILECs' deployment of fiber is not ubiquitous, which leaves many communities
5 with digital subscriber line ("DSL") service as the only ILEC option for broadband
6 Internet access (see my more detailed discussion below). In my opening testimony, I
7 show that as consumers' demand for higher speed increases, the role of DSL diminishes,
8 and so in those communities in Comcast's existing or proposed footprint where ILECs
9 have not rolled out fiber, there is only one fixed wireline broadband provider of high
10 speeds – Comcast.¹¹ Moreover, as I demonstrate in detail in my opening testimony (at
11 pages 47-57), even for those households that can choose between an ILEC's fiber-based
12 service and a cable company's offering, ILECs and cable companies represent a duopoly
13 in the broadband Internet access market, which does not yield effective competition.
14 Also, Comcast and Verizon Wireless have cross-marketing agreements, which undermine
15 their incentive to compete with each other.¹²
16

¹¹ This attribute of broadband Internet markets applies to other cable companies' markets as well, but I am focusing on the markets that Comcast, post-merger, would serve.

¹² See Baldwin Opening (TURN), at 61-63 (discussing cross-marketing agreements).

1 Third, fixed wireless broadband Internet access is not in the same product market as
2 wireline broadband Internet access market as I discuss in my opening testimony¹³ (and as
3 I further discuss below.
4

5 Finally, as I explain in my opening testimony (at page 58), Google Fiber is an option for
6 few communities. The Joint Applicants' discussion about Google Fiber's possible future
7 entry into additional communities is entirely speculative.
8

9 **The residential voice market is highly concentrated.**

10 **Q: How does Comcast describe the residential voice market?**

11 A: Mr. Portfolio states that "Comcast is part of a very competitive voice marketplace, and
12 that "[f]or residential services, our competitors are traditional ILEC and CLEC providers,
13 nomadic VoIP services providers, and wireless providers."¹⁴

14 **Q: Do you concur with Mr. Portfolio that the voice market in California is very**
15 **competitive?**

16 A: No. In my opening testimony (at pages 37-47), I demonstrate that California's voice
17 market is not competitive. Moreover, residential consumer demand for cable companies'
18 VoIP-based product continues to increase. Among other things, I state (at 41): "This
19 characteristic of markets demonstrates that even the minimal competition that the cable-

¹³ Baldwin Opening (TURN), at 81-82, including footnote 176.

¹⁴ Portfolio (Comcast), at para. 6.

1 telecommunications duopoly provides is limited to those customers who seek a bundled
2 offering, consisting of a combination of broadband access to the Internet, and voice
3 service (and often with video service).”

4
5 **Contrary to Comcast’s assertions, the proposed merger would jeopardize the quality of**
6 **service (which already ranks near the bottom of customer satisfaction surveys) that**
7 **Comcast would offer in its expanded footprint.**

8
9 **Q: How do Comcast’s Declarants address concerns that have been raised regarding**
10 **service quality, specifically regarding “the transaction’s incremental effects”?**

11 A: Comcast’s Declarants’ discussion of post-merger service quality is not reassuring.
12 Among other things, they state:

13 We begin by noting that we have never claimed that Comcast has an
14 advantage relative to other cable companies in customer satisfaction
15 scores. The relevant question, of course, is the incremental effect of the
16 transaction. ORA is apparently arguing that Charter and TWC's current
17 customers in California are at risk of experiencing lower customer
18 satisfaction after the transaction. However, the data that ORA
19 references do not support this claim at even a very basic level: The 2013
20 JD Power survey data referenced by ORA shows that Comcast generally
21 performs substantially better than Charter and TWC in ISP and telephone
22 services in the West Region. In the 2014 version of the JD Power
23 survey, Comcast performs approximately the same as TWC in both
24 telephone and Internet service, with a slightly higher rating in telephone
25 service and a slightly lower rating in Internet service, and below Charter
26 for telephone and Internet service. Given that TWC has many more
27 subscribers in California than Charter, as well as inconsistencies between
28 the 2013 (and prior years’) and 2014 survey results, the impact of the
29 transaction on customer service suggested by these survey results is
30 ambiguous at best. And regarding the objective network benefits that we
31 have actually claimed will arise from the transaction—improvements in
32 residential and business network speed and quality, improvements in Wi-
33 Fi networks, improvements in home networking, and so on—such surveys
34 are mostly silent, *confounding objective network quality with other*

1 *subjective metrics* and offering no guidance *on the transaction's*
2 *incremental effects.*¹⁵
3

4 Time Warner Cable's ranking below Comcast in some customer satisfaction surveys does
5 not inspire confidence because Comcast's ranking is *also* low – the merging of two large
6 companies, *each* with poor customer service, simply consolidates poor consumer service
7 in a larger company without holding out much hope for the adoption of best practices in
8 the area of customer service.¹⁶
9

10 The “improvements in residential and business network speed and quality, improvements
11 in Wi-Fi networks, improvements in home networking” that Comcast touts do not excuse
12 poor service quality. As to the purported lack of objective measures regarding customer
13 satisfaction, Comcast could certainly commit to report objective measures of its service
14 quality performance (such as the percentage of appointments that need to be re-

¹⁵ Israel/Keating/Weiskopf (Comcast), at para. 28, cites omitted, emphasis added.

¹⁶ “How to save money on triple-play cable services, Navigate the changing world of TV, Internet, and home phone service—and save money doing it,” Consumer Reports, March 2014.

<http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2014/05/how-to-save-money-on-triple-play-cable-services/index.htm>.

In the spring of 2013, Consumer Reports subscribers:

- Ranked Comcast 10th and Time Warner Cable 12th among 14 providers of bundled offerings. <http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/electronics-computers/computers-internet/telecom-services/bundled-services-ratings/ratings-overview.htm>
- Ranked Time Warner Cable 20th, Comcast (cable) 22nd, and Comcast (mobile) 23rd out of 29 broadband Internet access providers. <http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/electronics-computers/computers-internet/telecom-services/internet-service-ratings/ratings-overview.htm>
- Ranked Time Warner Cable 20th and Comcast 23rd out of 26 providers of wireline phone service <http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/electronics-computers/computers-internet/telecom-services/phone-service-ratings/ratings-overview.htm>

1 scheduled, etc.) on its web site. In a competitive market, one would expect companies to
2 brag about their performance and customer satisfaction with reference to specific metrics.

3
4 Comcast's poor customer service is clearly of concern to consumers, and this concern is
5 further corroborated by an article that appeared earlier this week in a California
6 publication, and which states, among other things: "If you ask consumers about their
7 interactions or experiences with Comcast, it's not hard to find a deep vein of frustration,
8 even outrage."¹⁷

9 **Q: What then do you conclude about the merger and service quality?**

10 A: I am not persuaded that the merger is necessary to improve service quality, and indeed,
11 the mega-transaction is likely to jeopardize service quality. Regarding my first point,
12 regardless of whether the merger occurs, each company separately could decide to
13 allocate sufficient resources to improve its service quality, especially if Joint Applicants
14 perceive competitive pressure in the markets they serve. As my opening testimony's
15 discussion of the Joint Applicants' national and California revenues, and their net income
16 demonstrates,¹⁸ they each, independently, possess the financial capability to devote the
17 requisite resources to raise the quality of service that they offer their consumers and to
18 garner public acclaim for the improved service quality.

19

¹⁷ "Comcast customers' complaints hit home," Troy Wolverton, www.mercurynews.com/business,
December 8, 2014. I have reproduced this article as Exhibit SMB-46.

¹⁸ Baldwin Opening (TURN), at 13-17.

1 Regarding my second point, based on the Joint Applicants' substantial financial resources
2 and on my assessment of the lack of competition in the markets they serve, I conclude
3 that a lack of incentives thwarts good service quality. The merger would not increase
4 Comcast's incentive to improve service quality. The Joint Applicants have failed to
5 demonstrate that the merger will increase the quality of their service quality. They have
6 made no commitments to milestones, independent assessments of their service quality
7 and measures for improving their service quality. They also have failed to explain why
8 Time Warner Cable cannot adopt Comcast's best practices, to the extent that such
9 practices assist Comcast in serving its customers adequately. Instead, as I discuss below,
10 the merger will create new challenges that jeopardize the already seemingly poor service
11 quality that the companies now provide in their respective footprints. The incremental
12 impact of the proposed merger on service quality could harm residential consumers.

13
14 **The likely elimination of positions in the merged company and Comcast's integration of**
15 **two different systems, combined with the lack of competition in broadband Internet access**
16 **and voice markets will jeopardize the quality of service provided to residential customers.**
17

18 **Q: Have the Joint Applicants provided any additional information about how they**
19 **intend to implement a trouble-free transition for customers and integration of the**
20 **two companies' various systems and operations?**

1 A: Not sufficiently. Comcast states that it “has made only preliminary plans for post-
2 transaction integration.”¹⁹
3

4 **In its pursuit of operational efficiencies, Comcast likely will eliminate positions.**
5

6 **Q: Do the Joint Applicants discuss the likelihood that in Comcast’s pursuit of**
7 **operational efficiencies, Comcast likely will eliminate positions?**

8 A: No. Based on my experience analyzing many mergers, I anticipate that the
9 achievement of operational efficiencies will occur through the elimination of positions,
10 which does not further the Public Utility Code Section 854(c)(4) criterion goal that the
11 transaction “[b]e fair and reasonable to affected public utility employees, including
12 both union and nonunion employees.”
13

14 **Comcast’s emphasis on serving the mid-sized and large business markets could distract it**
15 **from focusing on the quality of the service it offers residential customers.**
16

17 **Q: How might Comcast’s post-merger focus on business customers affect residential**
18 **customers?**

19 A: Comcast describes at some length the purported benefits flowing from its transaction-
20 related enhancements, which it contends will enable it to compete more successfully in
21 serving mid-sized and large businesses. This very focus, however, would relegate
22 residential customers to the bottom of Comcast’s customer responsiveness pecking list,

¹⁹ McDonald (Comcast), at para. 9.

1 likely overshadowing any purported spillover benefits to the residential market.

2 Comcast's post-transaction increased emphasis on attracting and retaining business
3 customers could lead to the company's neglect of its residential customers.

4
5 **Because Comcast supports net neutrality, it should be willing to commit to extend its**
6 **existing commitment to net neutrality to seven years beyond any order issued in this**
7 **proceeding.**
8

9 **Q: In your opening testimony (at pages 84-87), you discuss the merger's adverse**
10 **impact on net neutrality, especially after Comcast's commitment to the FCC**
11 **(made in the context of its pursuit of regulatory approval of its acquisition to**
12 **NBCU) expires in 2018. Does Comcast reiterate its support for net neutrality in**
13 **its December 3rd filing with the PUC?**

14 **A:** Yes. Among other things, Comcast declarants state: "The lack of any overlap between
15 Comcast's and TWC's last-mile networks, and Comcast's stated willingness to adhere
16 to Open Internet principles—which prevent selective degradation of particular traffic in
17 the last mile—effectively eliminates any concern about harm in the last mile."²⁰

18 **Q: How does Comcast's repeated commitment to Open Internet principles affect the**
19 **recommendation you described in your opening testimony (at pages 87 and 106)?**

20 **A:** Comcast's assertion that it will adhere to Open Internet principles supports my
21 recommendation that this support be translated into an enforceable commitment

²⁰ Israel/Keating/Weiskopf (Comcast), at para. 54.

1 through at least 2022 (i.e., seven years after the Commission issues an Order in this
2 proceeding).

1
2
3 **III. MERGER-RELATED BENEFITS**
4
5

6 **Q: How does Comcast describe the benefits that purportedly would result from the**
7 **proposed transaction?**

8 A: One of Comcast's declarants, Mr. Portolio, asserts that "[p]ost-transaction, we expect to
9 improve our voice services for residential customers, among other things, by combining
10 the best aspects of the Comcast and TWC offerings," and that Comcast expects "that
11 greater scale and synergies will also enable accelerated deployment of advanced voice
12 services."²¹ Mr. Portolio also lists various features (e.g., Voice2go, the ability to send
13 and receive unlimited text message from and to Xfinity voice telephone numbers, and
14 expanded international reach for customers) that he suggests will be made available to
15 customers residing in the Time Warner Cable footprint.²²
16

17 The possibly faster roll-out of these advanced bells and whistles to Time Warner Cable
18 companies is a negligible benefit. Moreover Comcast has not submitted any studies that
19 show whether consumers want these features and how much more they are willing to pay
20 for the features (either through price increases, or through the absence of rate reductions
21 that might otherwise occur).

²¹ Portfolio (Comcast), at para. 8.

²² Id., at para. 9.

1
2 **Q: What are some of the other merger-related benefits that the Joint Applicants**
3 **describe?**

4 **A:** Comcast's declarants state:

5 As explained in Dr. Israel's FCC declarations, three main mechanisms
6 drive substantial benefits from the transaction: economies of scale,
7 expanded geographic reach, and sharing of technologies and services.
8 Protestors provide no detailed economic refutation of these benefits. As
9 one notable example, there is no refutation of the significant benefits to
10 business customers.²³
11

12 **Q: How do you respond generally to these claims?**

13 **A:** First, as I state in my opening testimony (at footnote 68), I have not examined the impact
14 of the proposed transaction on business customers, and as I also stated, the impact on
15 small business customers is likely to be similar to that on residential customers.

16 Moreover, my silence on the impact of the merger on large business customers should not
17 be construed as tacit agreement with the Joint Applicants, who state, among other things,
18 that "the benefits of combining the parties' footprints to serve super-regional businesses
19 are particularly relevant in California."²⁴ I would note, however, that the argument that
20 they offer that under today's pre-merger business environment "[s]uch a partnering
21 approach raises several challenging economic issues, including coordination problems
22 and double marginalization"²⁵ would justify continuing acquisitions in the cable industry,
23 leading to the logical end consisting of a highly concentrated national market served by a

²³ Israel/Keating/Weiskopf (Comcast), at para. 10, cite omitted.

²⁴ Id.

²⁵ Id., at para. 11. See also, id., at paras. 12-15.

1 single supplier. If the market has the characteristics of a natural monopoly, then it should
2 be regulated as such.

3 **Q: Does Comcast assert that residential customers will benefit from the transaction as**
4 **well?**

5 A: Yes.²⁶ Comcast states:

6 Products developed for the medium-sized or enterprise segments can often
7 be repackaged and offered to small businesses and residential customers.
8 Small businesses and residential customers will also enjoy the “spillover
9 effects” from investments and plant upgrades made to serve larger
10 businesses. As one example, the opportunities for business customers
11 described above will also be a catalyst for network expansion and
12 hardening, which will also benefit residential customers, including those
13 residing in California. More generally, Comcast or TWC investments that
14 *could* benefit residential customers are currently “landlocked” by
15 footprint limitations, meaning that the geographic expansion from the
16 transaction therefore unlocks value for incremental investments and makes
17 more such investments profitable. As described in detail in Dr. Israel’s
18 FCC declarations, these expanded investments will benefit residential
19 consumers via faster access networks (due to quicker rollout of digital
20 service and DOCSIS 3.0/3.1), expanded broadband and Wi-Fi networks,
21 and improved home network technology. These broadband improvements
22 will also foster a virtuous circle, as edge providers react to improved
23 broadband speeds with improved applications and services, thus
24 motivating further broadband improvements, all to the benefit of both
25 residential consumers and edge providers.²⁷

26
27 The key word in this excerpt is “could.” I am not aware of any specific, measurable,
28 enforceable commitments by Comcast to invest in “landlocked” unserved or underserved
29 communities. Vague theoretical claims of potential spillover effects for residential

²⁶ Id., at para. 20, citing Israel FCC Declaration, at paras. 161-201.

²⁷ Id., cites omitted, emphasis added.

1 customers located in unspecified areas of California do not justify approving a major
2 transaction that poses substantial harms to consumers.

3 **Q: Comcast states that currently [BEGIN COMCAST CONFIDENTIAL] [REDACTED]**
4 **[END COMCAST CONFIDENTIAL] “as many Comcast customers are in**
5 **downstream speed tiers of 25 Mbps or greater as TWC customers.”²⁸ Please**
6 **comment on the implied benefit of Comcast serving TWC customers.**

7 **A:** First, I am not aware of any specific, measurable, enforceable commitments (geographic
8 or time commitments) by Comcast to roll out higher speeds to households in the TWC
9 footprint. I understand that Comcast is hinting that it might do so, but as I read the
10 Israel/Keating/Weiskopf Declaration, it seems to me that residential households would be
11 an afterthought to Comcast’s pursuit of mid-sized and large businesses. The *potential* for
12 Comcast to offer speeds to an unspecified quantity of residential customers by an
13 unspecified date at unspecified prices is not a compelling consumer benefit.

14 **Q: Comcast also quantifies its estimate of the consumer benefit of the proposed**
15 **transaction that it contends would result from Comcast’s roll-out of higher speed**
16 **broadband Internet access in Time Warner Cable’s footprint.²⁹ Please comment.**

²⁸ Id., at para. 21. See also the similar Comcast statement (id., at para. 22) that, by year-end 2013, Comcast had more than 725,000 hotspots operating, twenty times as many as TWC. Comcast does not translate the implied promise of hotspot roll-outs in the TWC footprint into anything remotely resembling an enforceable measurable commitment. See also id., at para. 23, which discusses other general benefits. Simply being “better suited to offer an array of advanced IP voice services in competition with ILECs and other providers, and to continue to drive innovation and competition in this market,” does not mean that Comcast will actually do so. Id., at para. 23.

²⁹ Id., at paras. 25-26, citing to, among other things, Israel FCC Reply Declaration (Exhibit F), at paras. 220-221.

1 A: First, I will discuss briefly the “Form 477” data upon which Comcast’s declarants rely to
2 quantify the purported benefit. I will also describe Comcast’s assumption about
3 broadband speeds given that the FCC’s form provides ranges of download speeds to be
4 used by companies in the reports they file (for example, a customer who subscribes to 5
5 Mbps would not be recorded in the Form 477 at that specific speed, but rather in the
6 range “>= 3 Mbps and < 6 Mbps”). Comcast explains:

7 The data report the following ranges: > 200 kbps and < 768 kbps, >= 768
8 kbps and < 1.5 Mbps, >= 1.5 Mbps and < 3 Mbps, >= 3 Mbps and < 6
9 Mbps, >= 6 Mbps and < 10Mbps, >= 10 Mbps and < 25 Mbps, >= 25
10 Mbps and < 100 Mbps, >= 100 Mbps. For the purposes of this
11 calculation, it is assumed that each household is at the lower bound of the
12 relevant range. The difference between Comcast and TWC is larger under
13 the assumption that customers are at the mid-point of the range.³⁰
14

15 **Q: Please continue with your understanding of Comcast’s calculation of consumer**
16 **benefits.**

17 A: As I understand Dr. Israel’s analysis, he is relying on consumer demand (he states that
18 “the average broadband speed *enjoyed* by Comcast customers was...”).³¹ In other words,
19 he examines the speed that consumers *adopt* rather than the speed that the Joint
20 Applicants make *available* as a result of their broadband deployment.³² As Confidential
21 Tables 5 and 6 in my opening testimony show, and as public Exhibits SMB-47 and SMB-

³⁰ Id., at footnote 43.

³¹ Id., at para. 25, emphasis added.

³² I understand that adoption is *partly* linked to availability: if higher speeds are not available to them, consumers of course cannot adopt those higher speeds. But the converse cannot be assumed, i.e., it does not logically follow that because consumers have not adopted the higher speeds that the Joint Applicants offer, those speeds are not available to consumers.

1 48 to this reply testimony also show (the reproductions from the Joint Applicants' web
2 pages), higher speeds come with higher prices. In maximizing their utility (economists'
3 jargon), consumers make a trade-off between speed and price that best suits their
4 preferences, within the constraints of their household budgets. It is therefore misleading
5 to imply, as it seems Comcast's Declarants do, that all consumers, or that consumers on
6 average, *want* to purchase broadband Internet access at higher speeds (and
7 correspondingly higher prices). I do not believe that the Comcast's declarants compare
8 the Joint Applicants' respective *available* broadband Internet speeds, but rather, the
9 speeds that the Joint Applicants' customers have chosen to *adopt*.

10
11 Also diminishing the significance of Comcast's analysis of purported consumer benefits
12 is the fact that post-merger, Comcast could *increase* its prices, therefore transferring the
13 theoretical speculative consumer benefit to shareholder benefit. Comcast fails to address
14 this possibility (or to commit to any particular post-merger prices for broadband Internet
15 access).

16
17 Moreover, the declarants' analysis undermines their assumption that the broadband
18 Internet access market is competitive. In a competitive market, if consumers *wanted*
19 higher speeds than those that Time Warner offered (or for that matter than those that
20 Comcast offered), they could simply defect from one supplier and migrate to a different
21 supplier. Therefore, the declarants' analysis leads to only one of the following two

1 conclusions: (1) the Time Warner Cable consumer, on average, *wants* (i.e., affirmatively
2 selects), on average, lower speeds than does the average Comcast consumer (and
3 therefore the benefits that Comcast posits are zero) or (2) the average Time Warner Cable
4 consumer truly wants higher speeds than Time Warner Cable offers, but she has no
5 competitive alternative (which suggests that the broadband Internet access market is not
6 competitive). Based on my reading of the Israel/Keating/Weiskopf declaration, they
7 implicitly assume the latter, i.e., that consumers in search of higher speeds lack
8 competitive alternatives to Time Warner Cable's offering.

9 **Q: What value does Comcast assign for each 1 Mbps increase in broadband speed, and**
10 **what is the source of that value?**

11 A: The Israel/Keating/Weiskopf declaration submitted to the PUC relies on the Israel reply
12 declaration (from September 2014) submitted to the FCC. Exhibit F in the Joint
13 Applicants' December 3rd filing to the PUC includes relevant excerpts. In his reply
14 declaration submitted to the FCC, Dr. Israel relies on a paper he did not author to assign a
15 value for increased speeds. I do not believe that Comcast has submitted that paper as part
16 of its filings to the PUC, and there certainly wasn't time to request the document and
17 associated work papers in the time frame allotted to reply to the Joint Applicants'
18 December 3rd filing. Dr. Israel explains his calculation of purported national consumer
19 benefits as follows:

20 Even small increases in broadband speeds resulting from these
21 transaction-specific investments will be very valuable to customers. For
22 example, a recent paper by Aviv Nevo and coauthors found that a one
23 Mbps increase in broadband speed is worth as much as \$5.86 per sub per

1 month (to customers who place the most value on network speed), with an
2 average of \$1.76 and a median of \$0.87. Using the median valuation
3 (which is conservative relative to the average), each one Mbps increase in
4 average speed spread across all TWC customers would be worth
5 approximately \$95 million per year to consumers. Given the gap between
6 the Comcast and TWC networks and Comcast's commitment to bring
7 TWC up to Comcast levels, speed increases of several Mbps for TWC
8 customers seem likely, meaning that this source of consumer benefits
9 alone is worth hundreds of millions of dollars.³³
10

11 Dr. Israel further explains in footnote 270 in his reply declaration submitted to the FCC:

12 After divestitures, the former TWC systems remaining with Comcast will
13 constitute 9.1million broadband customers. Thus, a one Mbps average
14 increase in broadband speed for all customers would be worth \$0.87 per
15 sub per month x 12 months x 9.1 million TWC customers ≈ \$95 million
16 per year. Because Nevo et al. (2013) estimate a complicated non-linear
17 model, the precise calculations would be more complicated—for example
18 depending on the baseline broadband speed for each customer.
19 Nevertheless, I include this estimate as an illustration of the immense
20 benefits that the transaction will yield.
21

22 **Q: Do you and Comcast use the same set of data for summarizing consumer demand**
23 **for the Joint Applicants' broadband Internet access, disaggregated by speed?**

24 **A:** I do not believe so. Dr. Israel relies on the confidential Form 477 data that the Joint
25 Applicants submit to the FCC to support his calculation, and specifically relies on data as
26 of December 2013.³⁴ In my opening testimony, based on the Joint Applicants' responses
27 to interrogatories, I prepared Confidential Tables 5 and 6, which summarize consumer

³³ Exhibit F, at para. 221.

³⁴ Israel/Keating/Weiskopf (Comcast), at para. 25, including Confidential Table 1.

1 demand, by broadband speed, for Time Warner Cable and Comcast, respectively, as of
2 June 2014.

3
4 The Joint Applicants are anticipated to provide another set of data regarding consumer
5 demand disaggregated by broadband speed, as a supplement to ORA 3-64. As I indicated
6 in my opening testimony (at page 64 and footnote 140), as a result of an FCC-granted
7 extension, the Joint Applicants will be submitting their most recent Form FCC data on or
8 before December 11, 2014. It is my understanding that the Joint Applicants will provide
9 this information to TURN and other intervenors.³⁵

10
11 Comcast makes absolutely no enforceable commitments to increasing broadband speeds,
12 nor do any of its declarants provide any geographically disaggregated analyses (e.g., by
13 census block, census tract, community, etc.) of Comcast's and Time Warner Cable's
14 broadband speed deployment, with an overlay for the median income of the community.
15 Such a commitment and such an analysis would be far more relevant to an assessment of
16 the public interest of the transaction than the theoretical calculation of consumer benefit
17 that Comcast submitted. The former would demonstrate a tangible commitment by
18 Comcast to improve Time Warner Cable's infrastructure. The latter would enable the

³⁵ These data (because they likely correspond with June 2014) may correspond with the data that I summarize in Confidential Tables 5 and 6 in my opening testimony, and may provide additional information regarding geographically disaggregated demand data by speed.

1 Commission and intervenors to assess if and the degree to which broadband deployment
2 redlining is occurring in the two Applicants' California footprints.

3 **Q: What then do you conclude about the declarants' calculation of purported**
4 **consumer benefits resulting from the potentially higher broadband speeds that**
5 **Comcast might roll out in the Time Warner Cable footprint at some unspecified**
6 **time and at unspecified prices that customers may or may not want?**

7 A: The analysis seems irrelevant to me at best, and at worst, it undermines the Joint
8 Applicants' assertion that broadband Internet access markets are competitive. In any
9 event, the underlying source for the calculation has not yet been provided.

10
11 **Comcast's claim that the merger will spur ILEC investment that would not occur**
12 **otherwise is not persuasive.**
13

14 **Q: Comcast contends that the merger would spur ILEC investment.³⁶ Do you agree?**

15 A: No. Presently, ILECs, for the most part, unilaterally decide when and where to invest in
16 new technology, and as a result, the ILECs are further entrenching digital divides. As I
17 discuss in my opening testimony, AT&T and Verizon are not rolling out fiber
18 ubiquitously, but rather in those places where they find it profitable to do so.
19 Occasionally, the ILECs encounter resistance to this approach, perhaps most notably on
20 Fire Island, where a well-coordinated opposition by first responders, municipal leaders,
21 residents and businesses led to Verizon's decision to roll out fiber rather than to force

³⁶Exhibit Q (excerpts from "An Economic Analysis of the Proposed Comcast - Time Warner Cable Transaction from FCC MB Docket No. 14-57, by Gregory L. Rosston and Michael D. Topper, April 8, 2014), at para. 15.

1 customers to rely on its inferior Voice Link product, in the aftermath of Hurricane
2 Sandy's destruction of some of Verizon's outside plant. Based on my participation in
3 the consumer opposition to Verizon's proposed Voice Link roll-out, I believe that the
4 successful effort is an exception to the norm. More typically, ILECs control the pace and
5 make-up of their roll out of technology, which sometimes can be considered advanced,
6 such as FiOS and U-verse, and other times represents a step backward for consumers,
7 such as in the instance of Verizon's and AT&T's fixed wireless services.³⁷

8 **Q: But won't the proposed transaction create competitive pressure for ILECs to**
9 **accelerate their deployment of fiber in California?**

10 A: I doubt it. ILECs will continue to deploy fiber when and where they find such
11 deployment satisfies business case criteria. From the perspective of their shareholders, of
12 course this is entirely reasonable. From a public policy perspective, however, this is
13 troubling because some parts of the state will be relegated to inferior and more expensive
14 technology, in direct contradiction to the public policy goal of comparable service
15 throughout the country. Contrary to the Joint Applicants' representations, the merger
16 would not cause ILECs to suddenly deploy fiber where they do not now find it profitable
17 to do so to serve residential customers.

18 **Q: Why do you refer to "more expensive" technology?**

³⁷ Verizon indicates that it offers Voice Link to voice-only customers located in areas where FiOS is not available and "who have experienced repeated service trouble." Joint Petition of Verizon Pennsylvania LLC and Verizon North LLC for Competitive Classification of all Retail Services in Certain Geographic Areas, and for a Waiver of Regulation for Competitive Services, Pennsylvania PUC Docket Nos. P-2014-2446303 and P-2014-2446304, Verizon redacted response to Labor-11.

1 A: Where ILECs have not and do not intend to deploy fiber-based broadband Internet
2 access, they seek to encourage migration to their wireless service.³⁸ For example, I
3 participated in a regulatory proceeding in which a consumer petitioned the Pennsylvania
4 Public Utility Commission to require Verizon to deploy digital subscriber line (“DSL”) service in fulfillment of its “Chapter 30” network modernization plan.

5
6
7 However, in 2012, rather than deploy DSL to a community, which had satisfied the bona
8 fide request requirements pursuant to the Chapter 30 requirements, Verizon
9 Pennsylvania, at the eleventh hour, offered the community a more expensive 4G LTE
10 wireless broadband option to fulfill Verizon’s broadband deployment requirements.
11 Despite opposition by a consumer and by the Office of Consumer Advocate to this
12 alternative, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission ultimately permitted Verizon to
13 engage in this “bait and switch,”³⁹ which resulted in consumers having access to the more
14 expensive wireless broadband option rather than the wireline DSL they sought. If
15 competition were effective, Verizon would have deployed what consumers wanted, or
16 another supplier would have stepped up to offer the wireline broadband Internet access

³⁸ In the instance of Verizon, and as a result of its cross-marketing agreements, the customer may be encouraged to purchase Comcast’s service. See Baldwin Opening (TURN), at 61-63.

³⁹ Petition of David K. Ebersole, Jr. and the Office of Consumer Advocate for a Declaratory Order that Verizon Pennsylvania Inc. Has Not Met Its Legal Obligation to the Greensburg Bona Fide Retail Request Group Pursuant to Its Chapter 30 Plan, Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Docket No. P-2012-2323362, Final Order, February 28, 2013. See also Dissenting Statement of Commissioner James H. Cawley, February 28, 2013, in which Commissioner Cawley questions, among other things, Verizon Pennsylvania’s use of its affiliate, Verizon Wireless to fulfill Verizon’s network modernization plan (“NMP”) requirements, without having first sought regulatory approval to do so through a review of the NMP. *Id.*, at 2-3.

1 that the community requested from Verizon. Instead, the proceeding illustrates the ability
2 of ILECs to choose where to deploy fiber, an ability that the proposed merger would not
3 diminish. In his dissent, Commissioner Cawley stated, among other things:

4 Carrying the oversight method that is currently adopted to its logical
5 extreme in view of the Verizon PA – Verizon Wireless “joint venture,”
6 the Commission will be hard pressed to timely react if this arrangement is
7 unilaterally modified resulting in the supply of a technically inferior
8 satellite retail broadband access technology platform to end-users in
9 selected rural and high-cost geographic locales, with the Commission
10 notified “after the fact” through the Company’s biennial NMP [Network
11 Modernization Plan] update report.⁴⁰
12

13 **Q: Why is the “Chapter 30” Pennsylvania proceeding relevant to this proceeding?**

14 **A:** Comcast’s arguments about the purportedly beneficial impact of the merger on ILECs’
15 investment are not persuasive. Regardless of whether this merger occurs, ILECs and
16 cable companies will continue to dictate which communities have what types of
17 broadband Internet access markets and those decisions, logically, will be based on their
18 business case analyses of potential investments.
19

20 A recent article reports, for example,

21 In May, Verizon also put the kibosh on any potential of bringing its fiber-
22 based service to any new towns during the Jefferies 2014 Global
23 Technology, Media and Telecom Conference. Fran Shammo, CFO of
24 Verizon, said that while they would honor existing agreements and
25 enhance existing areas like New York City and Texas, other cities and
26 towns like Hopewell Township will have to be content with a slow
27 copper-based DSL line.
28

⁴⁰ Dissenting Statement of Commissioner James H. Cawley, February 28, 2013, at 3.

1 “We’ll continue to fulfill our FiOS LFAs (license franchise agreements),”
2 he said. “We will complete (the FiOS buildout) with about 19 million
3 homes passed. That will cover about 70 percent of our legacy footprint; 30
4 percent we’re not going to cover.”
5

6 What this means is the remaining 30 percent of Verizon’s customers will
7 continue to be served by its aging copper network that will likely never be
8 upgraded with fiber. They’ll have the alternative of either paying for a less
9 reliable wireless connection, DSL or switching to a cable competitor.⁴¹
10

11 **Comcast has not made enforceable California-specific investment commitments.**

12 **Q: Does Comcast make specific commitments either by project description or by**
13 **estimated amount for its post-merger investment in California?**

14 A: Not that I am aware of. Comcast states: “We expect nationwide capital expenditure
15 savings to represent approximately 10 percent of TWC’s total anticipated expenditures in
16 2014,” and that “[t]hese savings will free up vital capital for other investment
17 purposes.”⁴² The Joint Applicants do not explain which investments Comcast would
18 make in California post-merger that would be above and beyond what Comcast would do
19 in the absence of the proposed transaction, nor does Comcast make specific measurable,
20 enforceable commitments to California regarding its investment plans.
21 Comcast also states that it “continually invests in its network,” and that it plans “to
22 continue the practice in the areas acquired through the transaction.”⁴³ However, Comcast

⁴¹ “Verizon’s battle with N.J. town shows strong thirst for rural wireline broadband,” Sean Buckley, Fierce Telecom, December 4, 2014. I reproduce this article as Exhibit SMB-49.

⁴² McDonald (Comcast), at para. 10.

⁴³ Id., at para. 22.

1 does not identify the specific additional expenditures in California that it will make post-
2 merger that it would not otherwise make.

3
4 **Comcast’s “voluntary” roll-out of the IE program is linked directly to the FCC’s approval**
5 **of its acquisition of NBCU.**

6
7 **Q: Please comment on Comcast’s reference to its “voluntary” broadband adoption**
8 **program, that is, its Internet Essentials program.⁴⁴**

9 A: IE began specifically as the fulfillment of a commitment relating to Comcast’s pursuit of
10 regulatory approval of its acquisition of NBCU.⁴⁵ There is no evidence, and indeed it is
11 improbable, that if Comcast had not been seeking the FCC’s approval of a complicated
12 merger with well-recognized risks, Comcast would have independently implemented IE.
13 Comcast, of course, is accountable to its shareholders and so cannot reasonably be
14 expected to embark on providing discounted services “voluntarily.” I simply wish to
15 point out that one might misconstrue Comcast’s use of the adjective “voluntary”:
16 perhaps, technically Comcast “volunteered” to offer the service, but it is important to
17 recognize that the gesture was part of a larger corporate effort to obtain regulatory
18 approval of its proposed acquisition of NBCU – that is IE came to be not as a result of

⁴⁴ Id., at para. 39.

⁴⁵ See Baldwin Opening (TURN), at fn 147 citing In the Matter of Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company and NBC Universal, Inc. For Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees, FCC MB Docket No. 10-56, *Memorandum Opinion and Order*, rel. January 20, 2011. See, specifically, Appendix A, at XVI.2.

1 some “corporate good citizenship” but rather as part of a multifaceted quid pro quo for
2 obtaining regulatory approval of a large controversial transaction.

3
4 **Comcast could enhance the proposed transaction’s public interest by committing to**
5 **increasing IE “uptake.”**

6
7 **Q: In your initial testimony, you discuss the low participation rate in Comcast’s IE**
8 **program. In its December 3rd filing with the Commission, Comcast discusses the**
9 **reasons for the low participation rate. Please respond.**

10 **A:** Mr. McDonald includes the Horrigan IE Uptake Paper as Attachment A to his
11 declaration.⁴⁶ Among other things, the Horrigan paper states:

12
13 Since IE began in 2011, the program has signed up 350,000 homes signed
14 up out of 2.6 million eligible homes. This is a 13% uptake rate. Is that too
15 high or too low? To address this, it is important to place the discussion in
16 the context of trends and challenges broadband adoption. Getting more
17 people to adopt broadband at home is difficult, as the data below will
18 show.⁴⁷

19
20
21 **Q: Please summarize some of the key points in the Horrigan IE Uptake Paper.**

⁴⁶ See footnote 1 for full cite. Dr. Horrigan states at the outset of his paper: “I have no position on the merits of the proposed Comcast-TWC merger and the following discussion should not be construed as taking a position.” *Id.*, at 2.

⁴⁷ Horrigan IE Uptake Paper, at 2 (page 0045) of Exhibit N. In my opening testimony, I discuss and reference two other papers by Dr. Horrigan. See Baldwin Opening (TURN) at 75-76, citing to Comcast response to TURN Q-1:3 (reproduced as Exhibit SMB-35), citing John B. Horrigan, Ph.D., *The Essentials of Connectivity: Comcast’s Internet Essentials Program and a Playbook for Expanding Broadband Adoption and Use in America* (Mar. 2014) (“Horrigan Report”). Mr. McDonald includes the Horrigan Report, which was funded by The Comcast Technology Research & Development Fund (see Horrigan Report, page preceding the table of contents) as part of Attachment A to his declaration. See also footnote 101 in my opening testimony, which cites to a different report by Dr. Horrigan, “Consumers and the IP Transition: Communications patterns in the midst of technological change,” November 2014.

1 A: Among the valuable findings are the following:

- 2 • Because some IE-eligible households may already subscribe to broadband
3 Internet access independently from the IE program, the 13% uptake rate could be
4 considered to be a low estimate of broadband adoption by the target population.⁴⁸
- 5 • IE has contributed to low-income adoption of broadband Internet access: Dr.
6 Horrigan approximates that 25% of adoption by low-income households since
7 2009 can be attributed to the IE program.⁴⁹
- 8 • Cost is one of several barriers to adoption.⁵⁰ Dr. Horrigan observes that: “Even
9 though cost plays a prominent role in keeping non-adopters from having service at
10 home, research clearly shows that digital skills and insufficient understanding of
11 the Internet’s relevance are important as well. That is why programs such as IE –
12 and many funded by the Commerce Department’s Broadband Technology
13 Opportunities Program – offer comprehensive help to non-adopters tailored to
14 their needs, which include discounts on access equipment and digital skills
15 training. Comprehensive approaches to addressing multiple barriers to adoption
16 are seen as best practice in the field.”⁵¹

17 **Q: What do you conclude based on your review of Dr. Horrigan’s IE Uptake Report?**

⁴⁸ Id., at footnote 1.

⁴⁹ Id., at 2.

⁵⁰ See also Baldwin Opening (TURN), at 75.

⁵¹ Horrigan IE Uptake Report, at 4.

1 A: Based on its relative success with IE, Comcast is well-positioned to commit to (1)
2 milestones for increasing IE throughout its existing footprint as well as its expanded
3 footprint if the merger occurs; and (2) broaden the scope of the program to include other
4 populations. Moreover, in assessing the potential financial impact of IE in the future, it is
5 important to recognize that some percentage of the eligible population may already
6 subscribe to broadband Internet access, and, therefore not participate in IE.

7 **Q: Did you review Mr. McDonald's comparison of Comcast's IE "success" rate with**
8 **the penetration of its broadband for all households?**

9 A: Yes. Mr. McDonald states:

10 To put the program's achievement in proper perspective, after almost
11 twenty years of offering and intensely marketing all tiers of its Internet
12 access service, Comcast has achieved less than 40 percent penetration of
13 the service across its footprint. *Internet Essentials* has an average success
14 rate of 13 percent of the eligible low-income population in just three years
15 – with rates of over 20 percent in at least one city.⁵²
16

17 His comparison is inapt for two reasons. Comparing the 20-year history of broadband
18 adoption to the most recent three-years of broadband adoption is nonsensical. Societal
19 adoption of new technology starts slowly and then the pace picks up. Broadband has
20 become a far more established societal norm than it was 20 years ago. It would be more
21 meaningful to compare the increase in broadband adoption by the general population
22 between 2010 and 2013 with the broadband adoption by IE-eligible households during
23 the same time period. Second, the comparison mismatches populations: ILECs and

⁵² McDonald (Comcast), at para. 55.

1 cable companies offer broadband Internet access, but only Comcast offers discounted
2 broadband service. Because a household in the general population is not one of the 40%
3 that adopted *Comcast's* broadband offering does not mean that the household has not
4 adopted broadband Internet access at all – they could be subscribing to an ILEC's
5 service.

6 **Broader eligibility for discounted broadband service would enhance the public interest of**
7 **the proposed transaction**
8

9 **Q: Comcast's declarant, Mr. McDonald, states that "[c]ertain systemic changes to the**
10 **program suggested by some intervenors, including in particular extending the**
11 **program to other populations, or creating an entirely new program independent**
12 **from *Internet Essentials*, are more likely to distract and divert resources from the**
13 **program than to advance it."⁵³ Please comment.**

14 **A:** Comcast's reason for not expanding the scope of the eligibility for its Internet Essentials
15 program implies that, despite the substantial merger-related synergies it anticipates,
16 Comcast is willing to devote only a limited amount of resources to closing the digital
17 divide in California. I understand that extending Internet Essentials' geographic scope to
18 include Time Warner Cable customers could increase the resources necessary for the
19 program. Nonetheless it is not clear why Comcast cannot further increase the resources
20 it allocates post-merger to the program so that it can expand the program's narrow
21 eligibility requirements to encompass other vulnerable populations.

⁵³ Id., at para. 31.

1 **Q: But expanding IE to Time Warner Cable's customers already represents a financial**
2 **commitment by Comcast, doesn't it?**

3 A: Yes, but the financial commitment is not that great when considered in the context of the
4 substantial merger synergies Comcast anticipates. Moreover, pre-transaction, the
5 Commission cannot know how much effort Comcast will actually expend, post-
6 transaction, to reaching out to eligible families who reside in the Time Warner Cable
7 footprint. Furthermore, even assuming that Comcast achieves a participation rate in the
8 newly acquired territory that is comparable to the IE participation rate in Comcast's
9 existing territory, the total financial implications are insignificant for a company with
10 more than \$7 billion in net income.⁵⁴ Indeed, one can examine the monetary implications
11 of Comcast's existing IE program in its existing footprint to create a rough metric for
12 estimating the monetary consequences of Comcast's merger-related promise to extend the
13 IE program to its newly acquired Time Warner Cable footprint.

14 **Q: How might one estimate that monetary consequence?**

15 A: Presently, Comcast offers broadband Internet access for just under \$10 per month to
16 approximately 46,000 low-income households, in Comcast's existing California
17 footprint.⁵⁵ Comcast does not indicate whether these households also subscribe to (and
18 pay for) voice or video. Without having access to data about the total average revenue

⁵⁴ See Baldwin Opening (TURN), at 14.

⁵⁵ McDonald (Comcast), at para. 25. In my opening testimony, I flagged this number as confidential (see pages 73-74) because they are based on responses to interrogatories that Comcast designated as confidential. Relying on the redacted, McDonald Declaration, however, I am not redacting Comcast's estimate of 46,000 participating Comcast-served households in my reply testimony.

1 derived from these 46,000 households and the costs of serving them, I cannot comment
2 on the average per-household *net income* associated with IE, that is, it is impossible to
3 conclude that the \$9.95 monthly price does not cover Comcast's incremental cost of
4 providing the discounted service. Simply because Comcast discounts the price does not
5 mean that the service is unprofitable. Assuming that *none of these households subscribe*
6 *to any other Comcast service*, and assuming that approximately 46,000 customers in the
7 Time Warner Cable footprint subscribe to IE after three years of outreach,⁵⁶ and
8 comparing the IE price of \$9.95 per month⁵⁷ with Comcast's stand-alone broadband price
9 of \$39.95,⁵⁸ then, by 2018, Comcast would be foregoing⁵⁹ \$30 per month from 46,000
10 customers, or approximately \$16.6 million annually as a result of expanding its IE
11 program to the TWC footprint.⁶⁰

12 **Q: Might some of these new IE households end up subscribing to other Comcast**
13 **services?**

⁵⁶ See Baldwin Opening (TURN), at Confidential Table 2 for comparisons of the quantities of households passed in each of the Joint Applicants' California footprints, which I use to estimate the potential scale of an IE program being extended to TWC customers. I assume the same participation rate.

⁵⁷ McDonald (Comcast), at para. 26.

⁵⁸ <http://www.comcast.com/internet-service.html>, site visited December 7, 2014. I reproduce the web site information in Exhibit SMB-47. The location that the web site specifies is Newburyport, Massachusetts, the location of my business. I have no reason to think that the price would differ in California. See, also, Baldwin Opening (TURN), at Confidential Table 6.

⁵⁹ Of course, if, without the IE program, these households would not have subscribed to Comcast's broadband Internet access, the revenue is not precisely "foregone."

⁶⁰ The program has provided more than 30,000 computers for under \$150. McDonald (Comcast), at para. 26.

1 A: Yes. Some IE customers might subscribe to other Comcast services (voice and video),
2 which would offset these foregone revenues. Also, without access to more information,
3 one cannot compare Comcast's monthly cost of providing broadband Internet access to
4 the discounted rate of \$9.95 and so one cannot determine whether Comcast is "losing
5 money" by serving these customers. The fact that Comcast is able to set rates
6 substantially above \$9.95 per month for the general population simply reflects the lack of
7 competition in the broadband Internet access market: the "going rate" for broadband
8 Internet access likely includes supracompetitive profits, and is unlikely to be the rate that
9 would prevail in an effectively competitive market.⁶¹

10
11 Moreover, for those households that already subscribe to Comcast's video or voice
12 service, the incremental cost of allowing the customer to obtain broadband Internet
13 access at approximately \$10.00 is likely less than for those households who do not
14 subscribe to any Comcast service. Finally, the magnitude of the foregone revenues
15 should be compared with my estimate of California's share of the merger-related
16 synergies, which I estimate to reach as high as [BEGIN COMCAST

17 **CONFIDENTIAL]** [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED] **[END COMCAST CONFIDENTIAL]** (see discussion
19 below).

⁶¹ Nationally, Comcast derives net income of more than \$7 billion per year. See Baldwin Opening (TURN), at 14. See, also, Id., at fn 171, citing http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/upshot/why-the-us-has-fallen-behind-in-internet-speed-andaffordability.html?smid=fb-share&_r=0.

1 **Q: Comcast states that “[f]or those who do not qualify for *Internet Essentials*, Comcast**
2 **has also committed to continue to offer consumers the option to purchase**
3 **broadband service on a standalone basis.”⁶² Is this a sufficient approach for closing**
4 **the digital divide?**

5 A: No. First, according to Comcast’s web site, Comcast’s least expensive stand-alone
6 options are \$39.95 for 3 Mbps (called Economy Plus) and \$49.95 for 6 Mbps for
7 Performance Starter.⁶³ The IE speed that the Joint Applicants describe in their December
8 3rd filing is 5 Mbps,⁶⁴ which is closer to the Performance Starter speed than it is to the
9 Economy Plus speed, but the price for Performance Starter is *five times* that of the IE
10 option. (Time Warner Cable’s least expensive stand-alone options are \$14.99 for 3 Mbps
11 (called Everyday Low Price) and \$29.99 for 10 Mbps (called “Basic”).⁶⁵ However, as I
12 explain in my opening testimony (at pages 89-91), Comcast has not yet decided how it
13 will integrate its products and I do not believe that Comcast has committed to offer the

⁶² McDonald (Comcast), at para. 57.

⁶³ <http://www.comcast.com/internet-service.html>, site visited December 7, 2014. I reproduce the web site information in Exhibit SMB-47. The location that the web site specifies is Newburyport, Massachusetts, the location of my business. I have no reason to think that the price would differ in California.

⁶⁴ McDonald (Comcast), at para. 50. However, for information about the speed of Internet Essentials, see also Baldwin Opening (TURN), at Confidential Table 6, which is based on Comcast’s response to Comcast confidential response to ORA Q-1:9, Confidential Exhibit, ORA/Comcast Supplemental Response R-1:9, Comcast_ORA_0001093.

⁶⁵ <https://www.timewarnercable.com/en/plans-packages/internet/internet-service-plans.html>, site visited December 7, 2014. I reproduce the web site information in Exhibit SMB-48. The location that the web site specifies is Newburyport, Massachusetts. I have no reason to think that the price would differ in California.

1 lower-priced stand-alone broadband Internet access options that Time Warner Cable
2 offers.

3 **Q: What then do you conclude based on your analysis of Comcast's reasons for its**
4 **unwillingness to expand IE to a broader low-income population?**

5 A: Comcast's stand-alone broadband Internet options do not represent a reasonable
6 substitute for IE for low-income households, households with elderly members
7 (particularly those with fixed, low, and moderate incomes), and households with disabled
8 members. Moreover, Comcast possesses the resources to expand its discounted
9 broadband Internet access and training programs to a broader population.

10
11 **The Joint Applicants estimate substantial merger-related synergies, but fail to commit to**
12 **measurable, enforceable ways to share those synergies with residential consumers.**

13
14 **Q: In their December 3rd filing, do the Joint Applicants discuss the synergies that they**
15 **anticipate will result from the proposed transaction?**

16 A: Yes. Mr. McDonald states:

17 Comcast anticipates that the transaction will generate substantial
18 efficiencies and cost savings. We estimate approximately \$1.5 billion in
19 operating efficiencies and approximately \$400 million in capital
20 expenditure efficiencies by the third year resulting from the nationwide
21 transaction, with operating expense efficiencies recurring at or above the
22 \$1.5 billion level each year thereafter (capital expenditure efficiencies are
23 not expected to continue beyond year three).⁶⁶
24

⁶⁶ McDonald Declaration (Comcast), at para. 8.

1 **Q: How do these projections compare with the ones that you analyzed in your opening**
2 **testimony?**

3 A: The estimated \$1.5 billion in synergies that relate to operational efficiencies is the
4 estimate that I used in my analysis and discussion of merger-related synergies.⁶⁷ In my
5 opening testimony, I do not discuss the *additional* annual savings during the first three
6 post-merger years that result from capital expenditure efficiencies, and which Comcast
7 projects will be \$400 million per year by year three. Using the same approach that I
8 used in my opening testimony, California's share of that additional synergy-related
9 benefit would be [BEGIN COMCAST CONFIDENTIAL] [REDACTED] [END
10 COMCAST CONFIDENTIAL] by the third year that should accrue during each of the
11 first three post-merger years to California in some form to benefit consumers and
12 communities. In sum, then during each of the first three years post-merger the
13 California-share of the operational and capital expenditure efficiencies reaches [BEGIN
14 COMCAST CONFIDENTIAL] [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED] [END COMCAST
16 CONFIDENTIAL]⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Baldwin Opening (TURN), at 98-103.

⁶⁸ Under Public Utility Code Section 854(b), if the Commission had ratemaking authority over Comcast's services, the Commission could direct Comcast to flow through half the California share of synergies to customers. In this proceeding, the substantial merger-related synergies provide support for the importance of Comcast making enforceable, tangible commitments to share benefits with residential consumers.

1 **Q: Will competitive forces cause Comcast to flow through these substantial synergies to**
2 **residential consumers?**

3 **A:** No. As I discuss in my opening testimony⁶⁹ and further discuss in this reply testimony,
4 there is insufficient competition to cause Comcast to pass on these substantial savings to
5 residential customers, or indeed perhaps to any customers. Instead, as I discuss above,
6 Comcast's achievement of those synergies will likely depend on cost-cutting, the
7 elimination of positions, and possibly price increases, all of which would harm
8 consumers and not be in the public interest.

⁶⁹ Baldwin Opening (TURN), at 98-102.

1
2 **IV. RECOMMENDATIONS**
3
4

5 **Q: Please summarize your recommendations.**


6 A: I recommend that the Commission reject the proposed transaction because it is not in the
7 public interest. Comcast's December 3rd filing fails to demonstrate that consumers would
8 be protected from potential merger-related harms and the purported benefits that the Joint
9 Applicants' December 3rd filing discusses are vague, unenforceable, and not likely to
10 flow through to residential consumers. If, contrary to my recommendation, the
11 Commission is contemplating approving Comcast's acquisition of Time Warner Cable, I
12 recommend that the Commission seek commitments from Comcast to mitigate the harm
13 and to translate vague promises into tangible benefits. I summarize my recommended
14 commitments on pages 103-107 of my opening testimony.

15
16 **Conclusion**

17
18 **Q: Does this conclude your reply testimony?**

19 A: Yes. However, within the limited time frame of this proceeding, I have not yet had the
20 opportunity to review and to analyze any of the highly confidential documents that the
21 Applicants submitted to the FCC in my preparation of initial testimony. Also, the
22 Applicants will not be submitting their "Form 477" information (which concerns the
23 speeds of their broadband Internet access, provided on a geographically disaggregated
24 basis) until on or after December 11, 2014.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the facts set forth above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and information. This declaration was executed this 10th day of December 2014 in Newburyport, Massachusetts.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Susan M. Baldwin", written over a horizontal line.

Susan M. Baldwin


Exhibit SMB-46

Tech Test Drive

Your weekly guide to gadgets, gear and technology. Reviews and ratings from CNet.com. Post your comments, events at mercurynews.com/business

Some of CNet editors' top holiday gift picks

These three products represent the best gifting choices available in their respective categories as chosen by CNet's editors.




4.5 OUT OF 5

Smartphones: Apple iPhone 6

The good: The iPhone 6 delivers a spacious, crisp 4.7-inch screen, improved wireless speeds, better camera autofocus, and bumped-up storage capacities to 128GB at the top end. iOS remains a top-notch mobile operating system with an excellent app selection.

The bad: Battery life isn't much better than last year's iPhone 5S. An even larger screen could have been squeezed into the same housing.

The cost: \$199 (with two-year contract) to \$709.95



4.0 OUT OF 5

Televisions: Vizio E series

The good: The models of the Vizio E series equipped with local dimming deliver superb picture quality for a very affordable price. The image evinces deep black levels with little to no blooming. The Smart TV component combines ample content with a simple design.

The bad: Color accuracy and video processing not quite as good as some competitors, plus poor sound quality.

The cost: \$471.99 to \$580.99



4.0 OUT OF 5

Cameras: GoPro Hero4 Silver

The good: The GoPro Hero4 Silver produces some great video for an action cam. Its abundant resolution and frame-rate options will satisfy beginners and experienced shooters.

The bad: It still needs a housing to be waterproof. Battery redesign means you can't use your old batteries and battery life will still be too short for some.

The cost: \$399.95 to \$399.99



LeapTV

A \$149 video game console that can teach reading, math, science and problem-solving skills. The players can interact with the system through body motion, pointer play, and a conventional game controller.

PLAY & LEARN



LeapPad3

LeapFrog's latest tablet costs \$100 and in addition to games, it can connect to the Internet through Wi-Fi and browse through LeapSearch, powered by the Zui search engine of Web content that has been 100 percent prescreened by a LeapFrog educator team.



LeapBand

A \$40 wearable device that gives kids a virtual pet on a watch face. The device monitors the pet's physical activity and allows them to unlock new characters as long as they engage in new activities.

Bay Area's LeapFrog seeks to be the Apple of kids tech products

By George Avalos
gavalos@bayareanewsgroup.com

EMERYVILLE — LeapFrog is offering an array of games and gadgets for holiday shoppers, including a new kids-oriented video game console, to battle competition from Apple, Samsung and others.

Apple grew from the iPod to a suite of digital offerings, and LeapFrog is poised to do the same, although in a specialized kids sector. LeapFrog's success with an iPad-like tablet built for toddlers and young schoolchildren has led it to push forward with a focus on successful elements of the LeapPad, specifically an emphasis on education and physical activity.

"LeapFrog is going after an area that nobody targets right now," said Michael Tchong, founder of San Francisco-based Social Revolution, which tracks the tech sector. "They are going after what they have turned into their specialty, which is the kids' market."

LeapBand is a \$40 wearable gizmo that Chief Marketing Officer Greg Ahearn calls "a great way for kids to get up and be active and have fun doing it." The device gives toddlers a virtual pet on a large watch that monitors her physical activity and dangles the prospect of unlocking

See LEAPFROG, Page 7

"My (4-year-old) son learned all the letters in the alphabet and their sounds, because of the 'Spider-Man' game on LeapTV. He didn't even know he was learning. He was reading and wasn't even aware of it. That sold me."

— Renee Bergeron, mother

Comcast customers' complaints hit home

If you ask consumers about their interactions or experiences with Comcast, it's not hard to find a deep vein of frustration, even outrage.

Take Hillary Murphy. In October — in the middle of the World Series and days before she was due to give birth — a Comcast technician came out to her Orinda house to move a telephone line to another room and to replace her set-top box with the latest version.

The technician had rescheduled the appointment twice. Then, hours after he finally arrived, Murphy's Comcast services — phone, Internet, television — went down. They stayed down for some four days, meaning that her husband, a big Giants fan, couldn't watch the team play in the World Series and stressing out the 34-year-old Murphy, who spent hours over the course of those days trying to



TROY WOLVERTON
TECH FILES

COMCAST BY THE (NOT SO GOOD) NUMBERS

31,980: The number of complaints filed against Comcast with the Better Business Bureau in the last three years.

22,332: Complaints filed with the BBB against AT&T — a company with three times as many customers — in the same time period.

More than 16,000: The number of formal complaints filed with the Federal Communications Commission against Comcast and prospective merger partner Time Warner Cable in the last five years.

70: The approximate number of FCC complaints filed against Comcast in just the first five days of September.

300: The approximate number of FCC complaints filed against Charter Communications, the third-largest cable company after Comcast and Time Warner, in all of 2013

Better Business Bureau, MuckRock.com, Mercury News research

See WOLVERTON, Page 7

Google ditching 'bots' blocker for simple checkbox

A couple of decades ago — before former Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's anti-crime initiative helped reduce lawlessness — I stayed with a friend in New York, but was annoyed at how much work I had to do to get into his apartment. I had to unlock a bolt lock, a regular door lock and a "police lock," and disable an alarm. He installed all this security, of course, to keep intruders out, but it also made it really hard for his invited guest to enter.

I sometimes feel the same way when I try to get into a website where I'm an invited guest. In an effort to keep "bots" (automated computer systems) from sending spam or other abusive practices, many sites require the user to complete a test of some sort to prove that they are really a human being. Often this is a "Completely Automated Public Turing test," or CAPTCHA, that



LARRY MAGID
DIGITAL CROSSROADS

See MAGID, Page 7

Tech

Improving your TV sound on a budget

A soundbar or ZVOX’s SoundBase offer great sound, reasonably priced

My son would like a soundbar for Christmas this year. He has a 47-inch flat-screen TV. Which one would be a good fit at a good price? I’d like to spend less than \$300 if I can. I found that you had recommended the ZVOX SoundBase. Is this the same thing, or a different product?

— Maria L., Minneapolis



DON LINDICH
SOUND ADVICE

ing more doesn’t always get you better sound. The ZVOX SoundBase is a speaker with built-in electronics and integrated subwoofer. It has a short, but deep profile and the television is placed on it, hence the name, “SoundBase.” Myself and others have raved about it because it is inexpensive, easy to set up and use, and most importantly, sounds really, really good. ZVOX does make a soundbar called the SoundBar 430. I have not heard it so I cannot comment on the sound. However, The SoundBase has pretty much become my default recommendation for anyone looking to improve their television sound on a budget. The company is owned and run by audiophiles, and their



ZVOX AUDIO/TNS

The ZVOX SoundBase, which can sit under the TV, has an integrated subwoofer.

product design, quality and life cycles reflect this. Most mass-market audio companies come out with new speakers and receivers every single year, sometimes radically different than the comparable models that came the year before. With receivers it is understandable, given the changes in technology. But if you are throwing out last year’s speaker design and coming out with a new one, in a way you are saying that you did not have it right a year ago and have to start over. The companies that make the very best speakers don’t replace their speaker line every year, or even every two years. They devote a lot of resources to make the products the best they can be, then keep them in production for sev-

eral years at a minimum, or perhaps make extremely modest changes on an ongoing basis. All of my favorite speaker manufacturers follow this philosophy, for example Axiom Audio, Definitive Technology, GoldenEar Technology, Magnepan, Ohm Acoustics and Paradigm. It seems that soundbars from the mass-market companies get

replaced every year with a new model, which is why it can be hard to land a good one. Not so with ZVOX, as they follow a product life cycle close to that of an audiophile speaker company. They did just introduce new models, but only after a successful run of the previous series, which was excellent. Your timing is excellent as ZVOX has a holiday special on their SoundBar 420, which is suitable for televisions from 32 to 50 inches in size. Normally \$299, it is on sale on their website for \$199, which gives you lots of money left over. It includes all the cables you need, as well as easy setup instructions, so all you have to do is wrap it! Bigger and smaller SoundBases are available for televisions up to 70 inches. For more details, visit www.zvoxaudio.com

Contact Don Lindich at www.soundadviceblog.com and use the “submit question” link on that site.

Wolverton

Continued from Page 4

get Comcast to fix the problem. “It was panic-inducing,” said Murphy, who works in Yahoo’s corporate communications department. “I didn’t want to come home from the hospital to no Internet.” Murphy’s sentiments are widespread among Comcast subscribers. Fremont resident Sangat Singh, 30, is frustrated that his Comcast Internet service goes down several times a week and he isn’t getting anything close to the 105 megabit per second speeds he was promised. Jim Busche, 48, of Campbell, remembers asking to have HBO removed from his service after a free promotional period ended only to be billed for it again three months later.

While I knew such feelings about Comcast were widespread, I didn’t share them, at least not until recently. I had Comcast service — first Internet, then a Triple Play package — for about four years and generally was pleased with it. I switched to AT&T’s U-Verse two years ago mainly because AT&T offered a better deal.

As I explained in a recent column, I recently decided to switch back to Comcast for Internet service, because after my AT&T deal expired I found I could get faster speeds at a lower price with Comcast. But I quickly started regretting that decision.

For one thing, it’s going to cost me more than I had been led to believe. Comcast refused to honor the second-year monthly rate a representative initially quoted me, even going so far as to deny — despite my notes and insistence — that the company ever discounts second-year rates on Internet access. What’s more, I found out in my second call that Comcast’s price to rent a modem was due to rise early next year, something the first company representative failed to disclose to me.

It was also a much bigger headache to install than it should have been. Comcast’s technicians postponed scheduled appointments twice because they were running late, leaving my wife and I to work around their schedule three different days. When a technician finally did come, it took him an extra 30 minutes to configure Comcast’s equipment so I could use my own router for Wi-Fi access, a change that shouldn’t have taken more than a few minutes.

Comcast representatives noted that the company frequently offers promotional rates for limited periods, and the initial price I was quoted may have been one of those. But they had no explanation for why the second representative denied that such discounts exist. And Byran Byrd, a company spokesman, acknowledged that twice rescheduling the service call was not an ideal way to treat customers. “It sounds like we missed it on that one,” he said.

Comcast officials say the company is working hard to turn around its reputation, investing heavily in recent years to improve customer service. Instead of requiring users to stand by for hours on end waiting for a technician, Comcast now schedules appointments in two-hour windows. The company is testing technology that will allow subscribers to track the location of their service technician to get a better idea of when they’ll arrive. And Comcast has doubled the amount of training time for its customer service employees, said Tom Karinshak, the company’s senior vice president of customer service.

But Comcast obviously still has a long way to go. Of the 200 or so companies rated in this year’s American Customer Satisfaction Index, only two — United Airlines and Time Warner Cable — drew lower ratings for their services than Comcast. In Consumer Reports ratings earlier this year, Comcast ranked 15th out of 17 companies for pay-TV service and 10th out of 14 for bundled services.

Even J.D. Power, which Karinshak proudly notes has upped its rating for Comcast’s services in recent years, generally gives the company below average marks, despite that improvement.

From where I’m sitting, the key problem is competition — or a lack thereof. Customers like Murphy feel like they don’t have any real choice other than Comcast and are angered by what they have to endure because of that. And Comcast, because of that lack of perceived or real choice, doesn’t seem to feel much pressure to seriously address its problems.

I hope regulators keep that in mind as they evaluate moves that could further affect the competitive landscape, such as Comcast’s proposed merger with Time Warner and new net neutrality rules. The last thing the company needs is less pressure to change.

Contact Troy Wolverton at 408-840-4285 or twolverton@mercurynews.com. Follow him at www.mercurynews.com/troy-wolverton or [Twitter.com/troywolv](https://twitter.com/troywolv).

TiVo raises bar with Roamio Plus

DVR covers the basics, and then some

By Anick Jesdanun
Associated Press

EDISON, N.J. — For avid television viewers out there, the standard digital-video recorder that comes with your cable TV box just isn’t enough. TiVo can add to the TV watching experience.

TiVo Roamio Plus (\$400): TiVo gave us DVRs long before cable companies did. But as cable DVR offerings got better, TiVo started to feel redundant. What TiVo does better

is search. TiVo can automatically record all movies and TV shows based on wish lists of favorite actors or keywords, for instance. With standard DVRs, you’re typically limited to choosing a specific TV series or episode. But if that series is featured on a talk show, not only do you have to know about it, you also have to find and record that separately. Not so with TiVo. TiVo also lets you watch online video services such

as Netflix and Major League Baseball on your big-screen TV, as long as you have a subscription with the service. Stand-alone streaming devices such as Apple TV and Roku can do more, but TiVo offers the basics if you don’t want another separate device. TiVo also has free phone and tablet apps for viewing live or recorded shows while traveling. The app sometimes gets cranky and won’t let me sign in, but playback is smooth when it does work. Video quality is better when you download

shows ahead of time, but that takes up space on your phone or tablet. The downside with TiVo is that you must pay twice. On top of the device (TiVo’s mid-range Roamio Plus model costs \$400), you will pay a monthly service fee of \$15. Although the monthly fee is comparable to what you’d pay for cable DVR, you generally aren’t charged for that device. TiVo offers cheaper models, but if you want to watch on your phone or tablet you’ll need a separate \$130 TiVo Stream box.

LeapFrog

Continued from Page 4

new characters so long as they engage in new activities.

A potential game-changer for the Emeryville company might be the new LeapTV, a \$149 video game console that the company rolled out this year. CEO John Barbour recently described LeapTV as “a revolution.” The game console is designed to “Get minds and bodies moving” with educational, active games that were already a trademark for the LeapPad.

Kim Espino of Campbell said her 6-year-old daughter has been playing LeapFrog games for a couple of years, and now has moved up to the LeapTV.

“She loves it,” Espino said. “She also plays the games for a long time. They don’t end quickly like you see with standard video games. And adults and older kids can play the games with her as well.”

“I was a little skeptical at first because initially I thought that the last thing preschoolers need is a video game system,” said Renee Bergeron, a

mother of teenagers and younger kids including a 4-year-old son for whom she got the new LeapTV. Bergeron changed her mind as soon as she got the console out of the box and undertook what was literally a five-minute setup to her flat-screen TV set. “My (4-year-old) son learned all the letters in the alphabet and their sounds, because of the ‘Spider-Man’ game on LeapTV,” said Bergeron, who blogs about the LeapTV and other LeapFrog products at her bakersedozenandapolloxiv.com website. “He didn’t even know he was learning. He was reading and wasn’t even aware of it. That sold me.” The games that run on the console can teach reading, math, science and problem-solving skills. The players can interact with the system through body motion, pointer play, and a conventional game controller. At the same time that LeapFrog seeks to capture new territory with its video game console, the company faces additional foes in its original arena of the kid-oriented tablet. “In 2011, we were the only game in town, but now you have more people getting interested in the kids’ market,” Ahearn said. “Sure, Apple is a

competitor, but probably not as big a competitor as Samsung, which has created a Samsung tablet for kids, or VTech, which creates kids’ toys and offers a tablet,” the executive added, noting that LeapFrog still has the top market share for kids tablets. The company’s latest tablet, Leap-Pad3, costs \$100 and is built tough for kids to ensure the tablet continues to function even if its dropped or suffers a significant impact. In addition to games, the tablet can connect to the Internet through Wi-Fi and browse through LeapSearch, powered by the Zui search engine of Web content that has been 100 percent prescreened by a LeapFrog educator team. “You are seeing LeapFrog and other companies creating the equivalent of tablets dedicated just for the young audience,” said Tim Bajarin, principal analyst with Campbell-based Creative Strategies, a market researcher. “This is an important year for LeapFrog to be able to put a stake in the ground for their products that are aimed at kids.”

Contact George Avalos at 408-859-5167. Follow him at [Twitter.com/georgeavalos](https://twitter.com/georgeavalos).

Magid

Continued from Page 4

presents you with weirdly displayed and distorted letters and numbers that are not only difficult for computers to automatically recognize, but hard on humans too. I often have trouble deciphering the exact characters to type in a CAPTCHA, and it’s not uncommon for me to give up after several tries. Sometimes they’ll have an alternative method such as listening to an audio recording of the characters, but that requires you to turn up the speakers or use headphones, which isn’t always practical. And even the audio is sometimes hard to decipher, in an effort to thwart voice-recognition software. And, ironically, even though these CAPTCHAs sometimes thwart humans like me, they can’t always fool computer systems. Google discovered that there are algorithms that can “decipher the hardest distorted text puzzles” with better than 99 percent accuracy. In addition to software designed to tell humans from machines, there are plenty of systems designed to make sure an authorized human is entering the site. In most cases, these consist of a simple user name and password, but to thwart intruders, some sites are resorting to more complex entry systems, including asking you to recognize a picture or requiring you to answer a question like your mother’s maiden name or make and model of your first car.

Increasingly we’re seeing optional “two-factor authentication,” in which the site sends a unique code to your smartphone or other device that you’re required to type in before you can enter. Two-factor authentication is more secure, but it won’t work if your cellphone has a dead battery or you don’t have it with you. We need better security. Usernames and passwords are no longer sufficient, and I certainly understand why sites would use CAPTCHAs to cut down on machine-generated spam, but we need to find systems that are hard for bad guys to break, but easy for good folks to use. Google is one of the companies that has used those frustrating CAPTCHAs, but it’s now switching to a more sophisticated yet easier to use solution called the “No CAPTCHA reCAPTCHA” From a user perspective, the process couldn’t be easier. You just check a box that says “I’m not a robot.” It doesn’t just take your word for it. Using what Google calls “an Advanced Risk Analysis back end,” the new system “actively considers a user’s entire engagement with the CAPTCHA” by evaluating a broad range of cues that distinguish humans from bots, according to the Mountain View Internet company. It’s not perfect, so Google sometimes requires a user to solve a puzzle before allowing entrance. Google said that it worked 60 percent of the time on tests conducted by WordPress and more than 80 percent on Humble Bundle; the system is also being

tested on Snapchat. As with a lot of clever things that Google does, there is a bit of a creepy factor: These algorithms work by examining and recording our hand or mouse movements as we try to enter sites. I’m not sure how Google could exploit that information, but I can understand how — along with everything else Google knows about us — it could worry privacy advocates. However, any systems that make it easier for sites to protect themselves from spam should also be good news to the privacy community, so this is probably a trade-off in which privacy benefits outweigh creepiness. Google admits that it has more work to do to improve its CAPTCHA technology, and indeed, so do other companies that are trying to find ways to improve security without making life harder for legitimate users. There are trade-offs not completely unlike those that Mayor Giuliani’s supporters and critics pointed out as he was cleaning up Times Square — one person’s secure environment is another person’s police state. As long as we have to keep bad guys out, the rest of us will have to put up with some inconvenience and worry about being scrutinized.

Disclosure: Larry Magid is co-director of ConnectSafely.org, a nonprofit Internet Safety website that receives financial support from Google. Contact Larry Magid at larry@larrymagid.com. Listen for his technology chats on KCBS-AM (740) weekdays at 3:50 p.m.

Exhibit SMB-47

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Internet Plus Learn More	10+ View Lineup	Up to 25 Mbps <small>download speeds</small>	HBO® and HBO GO® included Access to millions of hotspots nationwide	\$44 ⁹⁹ /mo <small>for the first 12 months</small> <div>Add to Cart</div> <div>Pricing & Other Info.</div>

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Millions of hotspots nationwide

XFINITY WiFi gives you the fastest way connected to your favorite entertainment on the go, while saving on your cellular data plan. Download the XFINITY WiFi app to easily find hotspots when you're out and about.

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Based on April 2013 study by Allion Test Labs, Inc.
'Reliably fast' claim: FCC, 'Measuring Broadband America', July, 2012.
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Exhibit SMB-48



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Turbo	Up to 20Mbps
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Standard	Up to 15Mbps
<div>\$ 34⁹⁹ per month for 12 months</div> <div>Details ▾</div>	Order >
Basic	Up to 10Mbps
<div>\$ 29⁹⁹ per month for 12 months</div> <div>Details ▾</div>	Order >
Everyday Low Price	Up to 3Mbps
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Internet Plans at a Glance

Mbps, short for megabits per second, measures how quickly data can be carried from one point to another.

Download speeds

Ultimate 300	Up to 300Mbps
Ultimate 200	Up to 200Mbps
Ultimate 100	Up to 100Mbps

Extreme	Up to 50Mbps
Basic	Up to 10Mbps
Everyday Low Price	Up to 3Mbps

Upload speeds

Ultimate 300	Up to 20Mbps
Ultimate 200	Up to 20Mbps
Ultimate 100	Up to 10Mbps
Extreme	Up to 5Mbps
Basic	Up to 1Mbps
Everyday Low Price	Up to 1Mbps

TWC email accounts

Ultimate 300	30
Ultimate 200	25
Ultimate 100	25
Extreme	10
Basic	5
Everyday Low Price	5

TWC email storage space

Ultimate 300	10GB
Ultimate 200	10GB

Ultimate 100	5GB
Extreme	2GB
Basic	100MB
Everyday Low Price	100MB

Free Home WiFi included

Ultimate 300	✓
Ultimate 200	✓
Ultimate 100	✓
Extreme	
Basic	
Everyday Low Price	

Free access to TWC WiFi® Hotspots

Ultimate 300	✓
Ultimate 200	✓
Ultimate 100	✓
Extreme	✓
Basic	
Everyday Low Price	

Internet security software & parental controls

Ultimate 300	✓
Ultimate 200	✓
Ultimate 100	✓

Extreme	✓
Basic	✓
Everyday Low Price	✓

Option to buy your own modem

Ultimate 300	✓
Ultimate 200	✓
Ultimate 100	✓
Extreme	✓
Basic	✓
Everyday Low Price	✓

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Fast, reliable connections for your devices.

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Contact TWC

Find answers to common questions,
chat online or call us.

[Contact us ›](#)

Buying your modem vs. leasing your modem

You have the option of leasing your modem from us or buying your own.

When you lease your modem from Time Warner Cable, we work to ensure that you have the right equipment for your Internet service plan. We also provide you with technical support for your equipment. A small monthly charge applies if you select this option.

If you prefer to buy your own modem, please [refer to our approved modems page](#) to learn which modems are best for your TWC Internet service and how to activate your modem once you've purchased it.

Internet service provider plans

Selecting the right Internet service plan from the right high-speed Internet service provider depends upon many factors, such as your lifestyle, how many computers and devices you have connected to the Internet and how you use the Internet.

Time Warner Cable offers six Internet speed options, up to 50Mbps in most locations and up to 100Mbps in select areas. Try to get that from another Internet service provider.

TWC has speed tiers that are up to 15 times faster than DSL Internet. When you go with a satellite TV company, your satellite Internet is usually a DSL connection. Slower speeds, such as those from a satellite Internet provider, result from older technology that does not support simultaneous streaming to multiple devices like TWC's hybrid-

fiber network. Plus, you can bundle your TWC Internet service with TV and Phone. With a satellite Internet provider such as Dish, you'd have to bundle with DSL for your Internet.

TWC gives you free access to more than 300,000 WiFi hotspots across the country when you subscribe to Standard Internet speed and above. Try to get that from satellite Internet or another Internet service provider. Unlike AT&T, for example, TWC has unlimited Internet with no overuse penalty. And we provide free Internet security software – Verizon FiOS charges \$10 per month for that.

Time Warner Cable's Internet service can better support online video, social engagement, gaming and Skypeing.

So forget about satellite Internet and other less powerful options. Time Warner Cable wants to be your Internet service provider.

See our speed options above and see why TWC can become your favorite Internet service provider.

*All prices exclude applicable taxes and fees, surcharges, equipment, non-standard installation, activation fee, Directory Assistance, Operator Services, International calls and other one-time charges. By enrolling in this promotion, customer agrees to be bound by the terms of TWC's Subscriber Agreement which can be found at http://help.twcable.com/html/twc_sub_agreement.html. Triple Play offers expire 01/15/15 and are available to residential new and existing Single and Double Play customers. Triple Play price will increase \$20 per month for months 13-24. After 24 months, regular rates in effect at that time apply. Lease of at least one Whole House HD-DVR and one WH DVR compatible Set Top Box required. Standard TV for \$39.99 available for 12 months; in months 13-24, price will increase to \$44.99; after month 24, regular rates in effect at that time apply. TV & Internet offer expires 01/15/15 and is available to new residential customers who sign up for the Double Play (Starter TV/Standard Internet); offer may not be combined. After 1 year, regular rates in effect at that time apply. TV offer expires 01/15/15 and is available to current residential Double Play (Internet/Home Phone) or Single Play (Internet) customers who sign up for Starter TV; offer may not be combined. After 1 year, regular rates in effect at that time apply. Free Installation applies to Easy Connect Kit beginning 11/12/14 through 12/19/14. Free Installation does not apply to National West and Former New Wave and Former Insight locations. All services not available in all areas. Not all equipment supports all services. Subject to change without notice. Some restrictions apply. Offers may not be combined.

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Exhibit SMB-49

Published on FierceTelecom (<http://www.fiercetelecom.com>)

Verizon's battle with N.J. town shows strong thirst for rural wireline broadband

December 4, 2014 | By Sean Buckley

EDITOR'S CORNER

Verizon's ([NYSE: VZ](#)) ongoing war of words with Hopewell Township, N.J.'s officials over telephone service quality and lack of fruitful broadband service shows that consumers' desire for high speed wireline broadband is just as prevalent in rural markets as it is in large cities.

The telco recently found itself fighting claims that there were 156 "serious" and "chronic" telephone service complaints related on its copper-based wireline network in Hopewell Township. A number of customers said that they noticed line noise, static, crackling, buzzing and intermittent service outages during inclement weather.



Sean Buckley

Not surprisingly, [Verizon refuted these claims](#), telling New Jersey's Board of Public Utilities (BPU) that residents reported "significantly fewer landline service issues to Verizon in 2014 than in 2012, representing a 38-percent decrease in the number of trouble tickets over that period."

The township's grievance with Verizon is part of an agreement New Jersey made with the telco over 20 years that's now apparently gone unfulfilled. Residents want the telco to deliver the 45 Mbps of symmetrical broadband service to every state resident by 2010 in exchange for tax breaks and other incentives they promised under the "Opportunity New Jersey" program.

Despite the fact that local consumers paid nearly \$13 billion in surcharges with the hope of getting high-speed broadband service, they have yet to see anything four years following the original deadline.

"Verizon is turning (its) back on the commitment it originally made to cover the entire state," said Hopewell Township Committeeman Greg Facemyer, in a *NJ.com* [article](#). "This includes rural communities like Hopewell Township."

In nearby Greenwich and Stow Creek, a spate of customer protests over similar issues finally drove the [telco to start installing fiber in those towns](#). Hopewell has been pleading with Verizon to do the

same, but there are unfortunately two things that have emerged that will ensure they will never get fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) services.

For one, the [BPU and Verizon crafted a deal](#) in April where they would only be required to serve areas of the state that don't have FiOS yet with either existing DSL or wireless service. The BPU agreed with the telco's argument that they never agreed to provide fiber-based service.

In May, Verizon also put the [kibosh on any potential of bringing its fiber-based service to any new towns](#) during the Jefferies 2014 Global Technology, Media and Telecom Conference. Fran Shammo, CFO of Verizon, said that while they would honor existing agreements and enhance existing areas like New York City and Texas, other cities and towns like Hopewell Township will have to be content with a slow copper-based DSL line.

"We'll continue to fulfill our FiOS LFAs (license franchise agreements)," he said. "We will complete (the FiOS buildout) with about 19 million homes passed. That will cover about 70 percent of our legacy footprint; 30 percent we're not going to cover."

What this means is the remaining 30 percent of Verizon's customers will continue to be served by its aging copper network that will likely never be upgraded with fiber. They'll have the alternative of either paying for a less reliable wireless connection, DSL or switching to a cable competitor.

However, Verizon's unwillingness to build the fiber network into new areas is starting to cut into its overall FiOS results, a trend that continued into the third quarter of 2014. While [Verizon added](#) 162,000 new broadband subscribers in the third quarter of 2014, overall adds were down 6 percent from the 173,000 the telco added in the same period a year ago. Likewise, on the video side, Verizon netted 114,000 new FiOS video subscribers in the third quarter, down 16 percent from the 135,000 it added in the third quarter of 2013.

Verizon is hardly alone in not fulfilling a broadband promise to a remote community.

A similar issue arose at Qwest, now CenturyLink, in Silverton, Colo. In 2009, a [report emerged](#) that Silverton would not be connected to the rest of the state by fiber optics. At that time, Qwest had a \$37 million contract with the state of Colorado to link every county seat with reliable high-speed Internet access, but the carrier admits it has no plans to run fiber 16 miles to the town by the time the contract ran out in 2010.

It's not hard to understand why large telcos don't like building in rural areas: The lack of customer density means that they can't get the same returns on their investments. Nevertheless, Verizon is ignoring the fact that the desire for high-speed broadband is not just an NFL city phenomenon and the answer to address these customers should be fulfilled with a dedicated wireline connection.--[Sean](#)

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